The Conscientious Legislator and Public Opinion on
Taxes
By Lawrence Zelenak*
If a conscientious legislator desired to enact the tax policy
preferences of the general public (as indicated by public opinion
polling), she would have to start, of course, by identifying those
preferences. Unfortunately, on a number of important tax policy
questions, public opinion is difficult to discern; on some issues, public
opinion even appears to contradict itself. This article examines some of
the difficulties of understanding public opinion on taxes and offers
some suggestions as to how the conscientious legislator might proceed
in light of those difficulties. Part I describes two contexts in which
public opinion appears to contradict itself and suggests how the
apparent contradictions might be resolved. Part II offers three
suggestions for the conscientious legislator whose goal is to discern,
rather than to manipulate, public opinion on taxes—to be neither unduly
optimistic nor despairing about the potential for educating the public on
tax policy issues, to understand and guard against the manipulation of
public opinion by those with particular tax policy agendas, and to be
guided by opinion surveys that give the public a range of policy options
rather than forcing a choice between two polar positions. Part III briefly
concludes.
I. TWO EXAMPLES OF THE DIFFICULTY OF DISCERNING PUBLIC OPINION
ON TAX POLICY
This section considers two examples of the difficulty of discerning
public opinion on tax policy issues and in each case proposes a strategy
for overcoming the difficulty. In the first case, the proposed solution
seems simple and workable; in the second case, the problem seems less
tractable, and the proposed solution may or may not succeed.
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A. The Highest Rate of Tax Anyone Should Be Required to Pay
Accepting the Republican Party’s presidential nomination in 2000,
George W. Bush declared, “On principle no one in America should have
to pay a, [sic] more than a third of their income to the federal
government.”1 Although the source of such a principle is not selfevident and Bush offered no analysis in support of his claim, polling
suggests that Bush’s proposed ceiling is, if anything, too high to satisfy
public opinion.
A 1995 Roper Center/Reader’s Digest poll, for example, asked,
“What’s the highest amount, highest percentage you think would be fair
for any family of four to pay in all their taxes combined, no matter how
high their income?”2 The mean response was 23%, and the median
response was 20%.3 An earlier national survey, conducted by Peggy A.
Hite and Michael Roberts, asked respondents for the “highest marginal
rate of tax [married taxpayers] should have to pay . . . no matter how
much [their] income.”4 The mean response was 27.97%.5 It is doubtful
whether most respondents understood the distinction between average
rates and marginal rates, but to the extent respondents were thinking in
terms of marginal rates, their ceiling for average rates presumably
would have been somewhat lower.6
Other surveys have asked for “the highest percentage anybody should
have to pay” with respect to “all taxes, state, federal, and local.”7
Although asking the question with respect to “anybody” implies the
qualification, “no matter how high their income,” it is not surprising that
the failure to make the qualification explicit results in lower preferred
rates, with both means and medians well below 20%.8 Still other
1. George W. Bush, Republican Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech (Aug. 3, 2000),
in The Republicans; Bush Outlines His Goals: ‘I Want to Change the Tone of Washington,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2000, at A24.
2. KARLYN BOWMAN, AMER. ENTER. INST., PUBLIC OPINION ON TAXES 28 (2008) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050415_TAXES.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Peggy A. Hite & Michael L. Roberts, An Experimental Investigation of Taxpayer
Judgments on Rate Structure in the Individual Income Tax System, 13 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 47,
55 (1991) (emphasis added).
5. Id.
6. A taxpayer's average rate of tax is her tax liability as a percentage of her taxable income. A
taxpayer's marginal rate of tax is the rate that applies to her last dollar of income. In a tax system
with a graduated rate structure, a taxpayer subject to more than one rate bracket will have a higher
marginal rate than average rate.
7. BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 28 (reporting results of Fox News/Opinion Dynamics polls
conducted in 1999, 2001, and 2003) (emphasis added).
8. Id. In 1999, the mean was 15% and the median 10%; in 2001, 17% and 15%; and in 2003,
17% and 10%. Id.
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surveys omit even the reference to “anybody” and simply ask for the
“maximum percentage of a person’s income that should go to taxes –
that is, all taxes, state, federal and local.”9 Although this calls even less
attention to the highest income taxpayers than the “anybody”
formulation, the mean responses—in the mid-teens—are quite similar to
the mean responses to the “anybody” questions.10 In the case of the “a
person” questions, and perhaps in the case of the “anybody” questions
as well, there is reason to suspect that many respondents interpret the
questions to ask about the highest rate of tax the respondents themselves
should have to pay—in other words, a respondent may think of himself
as the “person” referred to in the question. This is suggested by the way
in which the mean responses are higher for respondents in higher
income groups. In a 2007 survey, for example, the mean was 13.2% for
respondents with incomes of $25,000 to $35,000, but 17.5% for
respondents with incomes of $75,000 or more.11
Even in the case of the questions of the “no matter how high their
income” variety, respondents seem to suffer from a certain failure of
imagination concerning how high the highest income might be. This is
strongly suggested by within-survey inconsistencies between responses
to “no matter how high their income” questions, and responses to
questions that ask respondents to assign appropriate tax burdens to
taxpayers at various specified income levels. In the same 1995 survey
that produced a mean maximum tax burden of 23% and a median of
20%, “no matter how high their income,” a question asking for “the
highest percentage you think would be fair for a family making
$200,000 a year to pay when you add their taxes together” produced a
mean of 27% and a median of 25%.12 The Hite and Roberts survey that
produced a mean highest marginal tax rate of 27.97% for married
taxpayers, “[n]o matter how much income [they] have,” also asked
respondents to assign average tax rates to married couples at various
income levels, “so that every household is paying its ‘fair share.’”13 At
9. ANDREW CHAMBERLAIN, TAX FOUNDATION SPECIAL REPORT NO. 154, WHAT DOES
AMERICA THINK ABOUT TAXES? 8 (2007), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/
files/sr154.pdf.
10. The mean response was 16% in 2005, 15% in 2006, and 14.7% in 2007. Id. In addition to
the “a person” question quoted in the text, the 2005 survey also asked, “Out of every dollar
what’s the highest percentage anybody SHOULD HAVE TO PAY in taxes?” BILL DALBEC &
AMIE WANG, TAX FOUNDATION, ATTITUDES ON TAX AND WEALTH ISSUES – TOPLINE RESULTS
5 (2005). The mean response of 16% was the same as the 2005 mean response to the “anybody”
question. Id.
11. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 9, at 3.
12. BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 28.
13. Hite & Roberts, supra note 4, at 55.
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$100,000 family income (the highest income level specified), the mean
average tax rate was 29.16%.14
In both surveys, asking respondents to imagine a specific income
amount—high, but far from stratospheric—produced higher maximum
tax rates than asking a “no matter how high” question mentioning no
specific income amounts. As far as I have been able to discover, no
survey has ever asked about the maximum fair tax burden for any
specified dollar amount of income above $200,000. Given the strong
evidence that questions of the “no matter how high” and “anybody”
varieties do not prompt respondents to think about taxpayers with very
high incomes, we simply do not know what the public thinks should be
the maximum average tax rate for a taxpayer with income of
$1,000,000, $10,000,000, or $100,000,000. There is good reason to
suspect, however, that it is considerably higher than any of the mean
responses to the questions that have been asked and perhaps higher than
Bush’s one-third principle as well. In the case of polls commissioned
by organizations with low-tax agendas, the failure to ask about average
rates for specified very high income levels may be intentional. Such
organizations may understand that the responses to questions phrased in
terms of “no matter how high their income,” “anybody,” or “a person,”
can plausibly be used as evidence of public opinion on the appropriate
tax rates for billionaires, and they may suspect that more specific dollarbased questions would produce results less congenial to their policy
agendas. However, organizations with different policy agendas and
pollsters with no policy agendas should recognize the failure of
imagination reflected in the responses to questions that do not specify
income levels, and they should address that failure by devising new
questions focused on income levels far higher than the low six figures.
B. The “Metric Effect”: Tax Dollars Versus Tax Rates
Opinions as to appropriate tax burdens at different income levels are
highly sensitive to whether the question is asked in terms of percentages
or dollars. In a study by Roberts and Hite, the average preferred
effective tax rate on $100,000 income was about 29% (corresponding,
of course, to a tax burden of about $29,000); when a substantively
identical question was asked in terms of dollars rather than percentages,
however, the average preferred tax burden was only $20,000.15 A more
recent study by Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron produced
14. Id.
15. Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Compliance, 16
L. & POL’Y 27, 32–33 (1994).
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similar results.16 This “framing effect” or “metric effect” makes a
significant difference in desired levels of tax progressivity; public
opinion supports much greater average rate progressivity when
questions are framed in percentage terms than when questions are
framed in dollar terms.17
Assuming Congress would like to distribute the tax burden in
accordance with public preferences as expressed in opinion polling,
how could it do so in light of these inconsistent preferences? One
possibility would be to rely on intuition about which frame—
percentages or dollars—is likely to produce the more authentic
preferences. Unfortunately, intuitions on this question tend to differ.
Commenting on their results, Roberts and Hite opine that the answers to
the dollar question are more reliable, because people tend to confuse
average tax rates with marginal tax rates, while “[b]y comparison,
assessments in dollar terms are unambiguous and therefore are more
valid.”18 In contrast, McCaffery and Baron describe the responses to
the dollar questions as being based on a “progressivity illusion” (i.e., the
illusion that a tax is progressive if it imposes dollar burdens which
increase with income, even if the burdens represent flat or decreasing
percentages of income as income rises), thus implying that the answers
to the percentage questions reveal the respondents’ true preferences.19
Neither view is entirely persuasive. When Hite and Roberts reject the
rate-based (as contrasted with dollar-based) questions on grounds of
confusion between average rates and marginal rates, their concern is
that respondents may be answering in terms of marginal rates when the
question is asking them to answer in terms of average rates. If so, and if
desired marginal rates are higher than desired average rates (as one
would expect), rate-based questions will produce higher average rates
than respondents actually desire. Although this is possible, it seems
unlikely. The concept of marginal tax rates is almost certainly more
difficult for the public to grasp than the concept of average tax rates. If
that is right, people might well think in terms of average rates when
they are asked to think in terms of marginal rates, but they would not be
16. Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1755–57 (2005) (stating that at $100,000 income, the mean preferred
average tax rate was 18.8%, but the mean preferred tax burden in dollars was only $15,200; at
$200,000 income the mean preferred average tax rate was 24.6%, but the mean preferred tax
burden in dollars was only $16,800).
17. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 16, at 1757 tbl.B; Roberts & Hite, supra note 15, at 33
fig.1.
18. Roberts & Hite, supra note 15, at 42.
19. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 16, at 1755. They do not mention the contrary view of
Roberts and Hite. See id.
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likely to think in terms of marginal rates when asked to think in terms of
average rates. When McCaffery and Baron claim that the answers to
dollar-based questions are influenced by a “progressivity illusion,” they
are implicitly claiming that the public’s true preference is for
progressive average tax rates, but that the public mistakenly believes
that average rate progressivity results as long as dollars of tax liability
increase with income (even if the increase is only proportional to
income, or less than proportional to income). They do not consider,
however, an alternative hypothesis which seems equally plausible: that
the public’s true preference is simply that dollars of tax liability increase
significantly with income, but that the public mistakenly believes that
achieving that result requires progressive average tax rates.
It is far from clear that either frame—dollars or percentages—is more
revealing of true preferences than the other. A possible approach to
resolving the inconsistency would be to ask the same respondents
substantively identical questions using first one frame and then the
other, with enough time separation between the two questions to
weaken or eliminate the influence of the answer to the first question on
the answer to the second. (The questions could be asked in one order
for one set of subjects, and in the opposite order for another set.) If a
subject’s answers under the two frames were not consistent, the
questioner would point out the inconsistency and ask the subject for his
true preferences in light of the inconsistency. This would be a
considerably more complicated process than the typical tax opinion
survey, but it is the most promising route for resolving the inconsistent
responses to dollar-based and rate-based questions—certainly more
promising than attempting to choose between the competing intuitions
of Roberts and Hite, and McCaffery and Baron.
II. LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD DISCERN RATHER THAN
MANIPULATE PUBLIC OPINION
This section offers three suggestions for the conscientious legislator
who wishes to discern—rather than manipulate—public opinion on tax
policy issues. The suggestions are: (1) be realistic, but not despairing,
about the role education can play in informing public opinion; (2)
understand how those with particular tax policy agendas can manipulate
public opinion and how that manipulation can be countered; and (3)
seek out public opinion on a range of policy options, rather than
requiring the public to choose between two policy extremes.
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A. Difficult Tax Concepts and the Role of Education
Part of the problem in discerning public opinion on tax issues may be
that some tax policy concepts are too difficult for most of the public to
grasp.
There is evidence, for example, that “even relatively
sophisticated individuals do not really understand [the concept of tax]
incidence,” the idea that the economic burden of a tax may fall partly or
entirely on someone other than the nominal taxpayer.20 Similarly, there
is good reason to suspect that the concept of progressive effective tax
rates may be beyond the grasp of most of the public. In one study, the
results of which are rather shocking, investigators asked a group of
undergraduate students who had just completed either an introductory or
an advanced tax class at one of two large public American universities
to indicate whether various tax systems were progressive, flat, or
regressive. One of the tax systems was described as imposing a tax of
$5,000 on a taxpayer with an income of $60,000, and a tax of $3,000 on
a taxpayer with an income of $30,000. Despite the fact that the
effective tax rate on the higher-income taxpayer was 8.3% and the
effective tax rate on the lower-income taxpayer was 10%, 57.5% (107
out of 186) of the students identified the tax system as progressive.21
Some have argued that education is the solution to the problem of
poorly informed public opinion on tax issues, but these results suggest
that there are limits to what education can achieve. On the other hand,
it is too early to give up. On at least some issues, the educational
approach appears promising. The choice between the Hall-RabushkaForbes flat tax and the current income tax provides an example.22
During the high point of public interest in replacing the income tax with
the flat tax, a number of polls indicated the public narrowly preferred
the flat tax to the income tax. In a 2002 poll, for example, 53% of those
expressing an opinion favored replacing the income tax with the flat
tax.23
Using other data from the same survey, Joel Slemrod was able to
determine that a substantial amount of the support for the flat tax was
based on the widespread misconception that the current income tax is
20. Steven M. Sheffrin, What Does the Public Believe About Tax Fairness?, 46 NAT’L TAX J.
301, 306 (1993).
21. See Michael L. Roberts, Peggy A. Hite & Cassie F. Bradley, Understanding Attitudes
Toward Progressive Taxation, 58 PUB. OPINION Q. 165, 172, 176, 178, 180, 183 (1994) (author’s
calculations, based on tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5).
22. See generally ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995)
(discussing the flat tax proposal).
23. See NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON TAXES 8 (question 25) (2003).
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regressive, so that a switch to the flat tax would be a progressive
He concluded that “completely eliminating the
change.24
misconceptions would reduce the percentage favoring a flat tax by
10.3[%] . . . from 52.9[%] to 42.6[%].”25 Correcting this misconception
would require only the conveyance of fairly simple and straightforward
information. This task seems feasible in a way that explaining tax
incidence or progressivity to the general public does not. The task has
not been made easier, however, by the fact that in recent years the
income tax has actually become regressive at the very top of the income
distribution, as a result of the extensive impact of the favorable rates on
capital gains and dividends on the tax liabilities of the wealthiest
taxpayers. In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available,
the average federal income tax rate for taxpayers with adjusted gross
incomes (AGIs) of one million dollars or more (23.0%) was almost one
percentage point lower than the average rate for taxpayers with AGIs in
the $500,000 to one million dollar range (23.9%).26 Additionally, the
2005 average tax rate on the 400 highest income taxpayers—the socalled “Fortunate 400”—was a mere 18.23%.27 In addition to the
obvious immediate benefit to wealthy taxpayers of highly preferential
rates for capital gains and dividends, the high-end regressivity produced
by those rates may help make the case for the flat tax with the general
public.28
24. Joel Slemrod, The Role of Misconceptions in Support for Regressive Tax Reform, 59
NAT’L TAX J. 57, 57 (2006).
25. Id. at 66.
26. Kyle Mudry & Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares, 2005, in STAT. OF
INCOME BULL., Winter 2008, at 8, 11 fig.B.
27. Tom Herman, There’s Rich, and There’s the ‘Fortunate 400,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008,
at D1.
28. To the extent the public desires progressivity and the current income tax is not progressive
throughout its entire range, it would seem more rational to eliminate the regressive aspects of the
current system than to adopt some form of flat tax (thus abandoning the progressivity goal in
despair). It is not clear, however, that the majority of the general public would agree. In this
regard, it is interesting to note the strangely populist flavor of Mike Huckabee’s support for
replacing the federal income tax with a national sales tax. At times during his campaign for the
Republican presidential nomination, Huckabee seemed to be arguing that the appropriate policy
response to the inequity produced by the avoidance or evasion of tax on some investment income
by some wealthy taxpayers would be to amend the law so that no wealthy taxpayer would owe tax
on any investment income. In one debate, for example, he made the following case for replacing
the income tax with a sales tax:
[Rich] people . . . can take their money, shelter it at maybe 15 percent income, not the
35 percent that the self-employed people in the country pay, or they can hide it away in
a Cayman Island offshore bank account and pay no tax on it. The average American is
going to resent the fact that there is not a level of equity in the tax system.
Fox News: Republican Forum (Fox television broadcast Jan. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15179/republican_forum_transcript_fox_news.html.
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The work of James S. Fishkin suggests an interesting approach to the
education problem: thoroughly educating a small number of people,
whose views might then be taken as an indication of what the general
public would think if it were similarly educated. Fishkin has pioneered
the concept of the “deliberative poll,” under which a group of people
selected using the usual selection principles of opinion polling are
brought together for a weekend of non-partisan education and
discussion on a number of public policy issues.29 They are polled on
the issues before the education begins and again at the end of the
weekend. Fishkin urges policymakers to give substantial weight to the
results of such deliberative polls, on the grounds that they represent
genuinely informed public opinion—what the general public would
think if it had been exposed to the education received by the polled
group. There are obvious concerns about the quality and neutrality of
the weekend’s education, and about the extent to which policymakers
and the general public would accept the legitimacy of the results of
deliberative polls, but Fishkin’s approach is nevertheless intriguing. As
it happens, the flat tax was one of the topics Fishkin included in his first
American deliberative poll, held in Austin, Texas, in 1996. Support for
the flat tax fell from 44% at the beginning of the weekend to 30% at the
end.30 At least on this important tax policy issue, education—either of
the general public or of a deliberative polling group serving as a
surrogate for the general public—does seem to produce better-informed
opinions, which can serve as a better guide for the conscientious
legislator.
B. The Problem of Opinion Manipulation
A public, poorly informed on tax policy issues, can be exploited by a
poll commissioned by a group with a particular policy agenda. For
example, in recent years, the Tax Foundation, an organization which
somewhat dubiously describes itself as non-partisan, has commissioned
annual polls on various tax policy questions, including the following:
Last year 43.4 million Americans–that’s one-third of all taxpayers–
paid no federal income tax after deductions and credits. Thinking
about your own tax burden, do you think this is fair, or do you feel
everyone should be required to pay some minimum amount of tax to
help fund government?31

29. JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
(1997).
30. Id. at 214.
31. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 9, at 11.
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With the question presented in those terms, it is hardly surprising that
the majority of those polled, 61%, thought this was not fair. This result
fits neatly with the Tax Foundation’s goal of increasing the percentage
of Americans with positive federal income tax liabilities. Scott A.
Hodge, the Tax Foundation’s President, has claimed:
While some may applaud the fact that millions of low- and middleincome families pay no income taxes, there is a threat to the fabric of
our democracy when so many Americans are not only disconnected
from the cost of government but are net consumers of government
benefits. The conditions are ripe for social conflict if these voters
begin to demand more government benefits because they know others
will bear the costs.32

A question designed to educate, rather than to take advantage of
ignorance, might have explained that in many cases the absence of an
income tax liability is the result of the earned income tax credit (EITC),
which plays an important role in lifting low-wage working families
above the poverty level. Such a question might also have informed (or
reminded) respondents that those who pay no income tax often pay
substantial federal payroll tax, federal excise taxes, various state and
local taxes, and in many cases have paid and will pay substantial federal
income tax in other years. Using simulations based on a simplified
model of 2003 federal income tax law and inflation-adjusted earnings
data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, Lily L. Batchelder,
Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., and Peter R. Orszag have estimated that “about
three-quarters of tax units who would be eligible for the refundable
element of the EITC or CTC [child tax credit] at some point during a
twenty-year period under current law should nevertheless have positive
net federal income tax liability over that period if historic earnings
patterns are any guide.”33 When they broaden their analysis to include
the employer and employee portions of the federal payroll tax, in
addition to the federal income tax, they estimate that over 99% of those
eligible for the refundable element of the EITC or CTC for at least one
32. SCOTT A. HODGE, PUTTING A FACE ON AMERICA’S TAX RETURNS: SOUND TAX REFORM
MUST BEGIN WITH A SOLID UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICAN
TAXPAYERS
8–9
(2005),
available
at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/
dba37618d9c2d2df02f24766ac4cc39d.pdf. Concern over an excessive number of Americans
without positive federal income tax liabilities is a frequent theme in Tax Foundation publications.
See, e.g., Scott A. Hodge, Number of Americans Paying Zero Federal Income Tax Grows to 43.4
Million, FISCAL FACTS, Mar. 30, 2006, available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/
show/1410.html; J. Scott Moody & Scott A. Hodge, The Growing Class of Americans Who Pay
No Federal Income Taxes, FISCAL FACTS, Apr. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/206.html.
33. Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 68 (2006).
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year of a twenty-year period should have a positive federal tax liability
over those twenty years.34
Of course, a question which included any information of this sort
might not have produced the answers desired by the Tax Foundation. In
fact, less leading versions of the same basic question, asked in prior
decades, have produced results which would not be congenial to the Tax
Foundation. A 1986 Roper/H&R Block survey asked: “As a matter of
public policy, do you think that everyone who receives an income
should pay SOME tax–even if it’s only one dollar–or do you think that
people below the poverty level should not have to pay any tax?”35 The
no-tax option was the choice of 59% of respondents; only 39% wanted
to impose the tax on everyone.36 When the same question had been
asked in 1979, the results were similar—56% opposed tax on the poor,
while 41% favored it.37 The only effective response to questions such
as the Tax Foundation’s question, by those who are trying to discover
true public opinion rather than take advantage of a poorly-informed
public, is to commission their own polls using questions designed to
educate rather than to obfuscate.
C. The Importance of Providing a Range of Policy Options
Perhaps the most important lesson for those interested in trying to
discern rather than manipulate public opinion is that polls must present
the public with a range of policy options, rather than merely with two
extremes. Two recent stories of public opinion and the tax legislative
process illustrate this point.
The first story is about the attempt to repeal the estate tax (which has
resulted, so far, in the repeal of the estate tax for the single year 201038).
When polls taken in the early years of the current decade simply asked
whether or not one favored repealing the estate tax, substantial
majorities consistently supported repeal. In the 2002 National Election
Survey, for example, 67.8% of those polled favored “doing away with
the estate tax.”39 Interestingly, and perhaps contrary to conventional

34. Id.
35. ROPER/H&R BLOCK STUDY #1986-0643: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE AMERICAN
INCOME TAX SYSTEM 16 (question 15) (1986).
36. Id.
37. ROPER H&R BLOCK STUDY #1979-0673: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE INCOME TAX
SYSTEM: THE THIRD IN A SERIES OF STUDIES 21 (question 22) (1979).
38. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115
Stat. 69 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
39. Mayling Birney, Michael J. Graetz & Ian Shapiro, Public Opinion and the Push to Repeal
the Estate Tax, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 439, 444 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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wisdom, purely rhetorical differences in the wording of the question
made little difference in the results. In the same survey, some
respondents were asked about “doing away with the death tax” rather
than about “doing away with the estate tax”; this increased the
percentage in favor of repeal only modestly, from 67.8% to 70.0%.40
What made a major difference, however, was offering respondents
intermediate options between repeal and the status quo.41 A 2002 poll,
for example, found a slight public preference for retaining the estate tax
and raising the exemption level to $3 million rather than simply
repealing the tax (by a margin of 47% to 42%).42 Another poll found
only 26% of respondents preferred outright repeal to increasing the
exemption level to $25 million.43 Polls also suggested that the public
enthusiasm for estate tax repeal would weaken if the public were
presented with a choice between estate tax repeal and an equal-size
income tax cut focused on the middle class.44 More generally, support
for estate tax repeal is likely to drop in any poll which makes the crucial
point that estate tax repeal is not free. In a period of budget deficits,
estate tax repeal implies some combination of increased deficits,
decreased government spending, and increases in other taxes.
The story of public opinion and the 2001 and 2003 Bush income tax
cuts is similar to the estate tax story. Despite the heavy skewing of
those tax cuts in favor of the rich in terms of dollars of tax cuts per
taxpayer, opinion polling consistently found modest majorities in favor
of the cuts when questions simply asked respondents to choose between
the Bush cuts and no cuts. In his analysis of those polls, Larry Bartels
concludes that these majorities were dependent on the existence of a
sizeable group of taxpayers who would support any package of tax cuts,
no matter how skewed in favor of the rich, as long as the package
included some tax reduction—however modest—for the taxpayers
themselves.45 Proponents of the cuts were able to claim public support
for the cuts precisely because most polling simply pitted the Bush cuts
against the status quo. As Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson have
demonstrated, however, polling which pitted the Bush tax cuts against
equal-revenue tax cuts less skewed in favor of the rich indicated a
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., id. at 448.
42. Id. at 447–48.
43. Id. at 443 (discussing 2003 NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy poll).
44. Id. at 447.
45. Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American
Mind, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 15 (2005); see also Larry M. Bartels, A Tale of Two Tax Cuts, a Wage
Squeeze, and a Tax Credit, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 403 (2006).
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strong public preference for the alternative tax cuts.46 One poll, for
example, found the public preferred—by a margin of fifty-three
percentage points—that the tax cut plan be “adjusted so more of the tax
cuts went to lower-income taxpayers.”47 And when the public was
asked to evaluate tax cuts relative to other possible uses of the expected
federal budget surpluses, respondents strongly preferred foregoing the
tax cuts and using the surpluses to strengthen Social Security (preferred
over tax cuts by a margin of 74% to 21%) or to shore up Medicare
(preferred over tax cuts by a margin of 65% to 25%).48 In short, public
opinion supported the Bush tax cuts only because most polling
presented the public with an impoverished range of policy options.
Bartels engaged in a rather sharp debate with Hacker and Pierson, in
a 2005 issue of Perspectives on Politics, concerning whether the public
really supported the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.49 The debate was not
about the actual contours of public opinion regarding the tax cuts—as to
which the two sides largely agreed—but rather about the descriptive
label (supportive or unsupportive) that should be attached to those
contours. According to Hacker and Pierson, the 2001 tax cut was
“directly at odds with majority views,”50 despite substantial polling
majorities in favor of the cut:
[T]hese polls say almost nothing about what kind of tax cuts the
public wanted and how much priority they gave them. In fact, by
isolating the issue of tax cuts from any discussion of alternatives or
tradeoffs, the polls fail completely to capture public opinion about
policy priorities.51

Bartels, however, argued that the position of Hacker and Pierson
reflected “a fundamental confusion about the nature of democracy.”52
According to Bartels,
Democratic policy agendas are set by elected leaders, not by voters.
As E. E. Schattschneider aptly put it, “The people are a sovereign
whose vocabulary is limited to two words, ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’” In the
case of the tax cuts, President Bush posed the question and the

46. Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the
Limits of Democratic Control, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 33 (2005).
47. Id. at 38.
48. Id.
49. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, supra
note 45, at 21.
50. Hacker & Pierson, supra note 46, at 34.
51. Id. at 37.
52. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, supra
note 45, at 21.
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people’s response, insofar as they responded at all, was a vigorous
“Yes.”53

As important as this debate may be from the perspective of political
scientists, it seems beside the point from the perspective of a
conscientious legislator—an “elected leader” able to participate in the
setting of “democratic policy agendas”—attempting to discern public
opinion on matters of tax policy. Suppose elected leaders presented the
public with a meaningful range of policy options, and opinion polling
investigated public opinion with respect to those options. (Even if
Bartels and Schattschneider are correct in claiming that the people can
answer only “yes” or “no,” the people can certainly be asked more than
one yes-or-no question.) In that case, the disagreement between Bartels
and Hacker and Pierson would disappear, because in responding to (in
Bartel’s words) “policy agendas . . . set by elected leaders,”54 the people
would be expressing their preferences among (in the words of Hacker
and Pierson) “alternatives [and] tradeoffs.”55
III. CONCLUSION
It is possible to create polling majorities seemingly on both sides of
contentious tax policy issues, by taking advantage—or not—of public
ignorance and confusion, and by artificially restricting—or not—the
choices presented to the polled public. Because of these competing
majorities, and also because tax legislation generally has rather low
salience with the voting public (that is, voters do not often vote for or
against a particular candidate based on his positions on tax issues),
legislators typically have considerable “running room” on tax
legislation.56 Often they can choose to support or oppose pending tax
legislation without much fear of voter reprisal in either case. In many
cases, then, public opinion will not greatly constrain a legislator’s vote
on proposed tax legislation. Even if she is not constrained, however, a
conscientious legislator will want to take public opinion into account
when making her decisions—if the opinion is that of a public wellinformed and presented with a reasonable range of policy options.
Given the ease with which public opinion on taxes can be manipulated
by the exploitation of ignorance and the restriction of options, those
who want to employ public opinion legitimately and effectively in the
53. Id. (quoting E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 52 (1942)).
54. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, supra
note 45, at 21.
55. Hacker & Pierson, supra note 46, at 37.
56. See Birney, Graetz & Shapiro, supra note 39, at 454–56 (discussing the concept of
“running room” with respect to tax legislation).
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tax legislative process are faced with a challenging—but not
impossible—task.

